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We present a new class of social cost-of-living indices and a nonparametric framework for
estimating these and other social cost-of-living indices. Common social cost-of-living indices
can be understood as aggregator functions of approximations of individual cost-of-living
indices. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the expenditure-weighted average of ﬁrst-order
approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index. This is troubling for three reasons.
First, it has not been shown to have a welfare economic foundation for the case where agents
are heterogeneous (as they clearly are.) Second, it uses an expenditure-weighted average
which downweights the experience of poor households relative to rich households. Finally,
it uses only ﬁrst-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index, and thus
ignores substitution eﬀects.
We propose a “common-scaling” social cost-of-living index, which is deﬁned as the single
scaling to everyone’s expenditure which holds social welfare constant across a price change.
Our approach has an explicit social welfare foundation and allows us to choose the weights
on the costs of rich and poor households. We also give a unique solution for the welfare
function for the case where the weights are independent of household expenditure. A ﬁrst
order approximation of our social cost-of-living index nests as special cases commonly used
indices such as the CPI. We also provide a nonparametric method for estimating second-order
approximations (which account for substitution eﬀects).
JEL Classiﬁcations: D11, D12, D63, E31








Cet article présente une nouvelle classe d’indices du coût de la vie et une méthode non 
paramétrique pour estimer ces derniers. Les indices les plus courants peuvent être 
considérés comme des fonctions agrégatrices des approximations des indices du coût 
de la vie auxquels chaque consommateur est confronté. L'indice des prix à la 
consommation (IPC) est la moyenne pondérée des approximations du premier ordre de 
l'indice du coût de la vie de chaque individu. Cette approche nous inquiète pour trois 
raisons.  D'abord, il n’est pas démontré qu’elle repose sur des bases solides dans le cas 
où les agents sont hétérogènes (comme ils le sont clairement.). Ensuite, elle s’appuie 
sur un calcul de la moyenne pondérée des dépenses qui sous représente l'expérience 
des ménages pauvres par apport aux plus nantis. Finalement, elle est dépendante des 
approximations du premier ordre des indices individuels du coût de la vie ignorant ainsi 
les possibles effets de substitution. Cet article présente un indice du coût de la vie à 
«  échelle commune  », qui se définit comme l’échelle unique de pondération des 
dépenses individuelles qui maintient le niveau du bien-être social constant suite à une 
variation du niveau général des prix. Notre approche se base sur une formulation 
explicite du bien-être social et nous permet d’assigner une pondération différente aux 
coûts engendrés par les ménages riches et les ménages pauvres. Nous offrons 
également une solution unique au problème du choix de la fonction du bien-être social 
dans le cas où les pondérations seraient indépendantes des dépenses des ménages.  
Nous montrons que les indices communément utilisés, tel l’IPC, représentent des cas 
particuliers de l’approximation de premier d'ordre de notre nouvelle classe d’indices. 
Nous  présentons également une méthode non paramétrique nous permettant d’estimer 




“How has the cost-of-living changed?” is among the ﬁrst questions that policy makers and
the public ask of economists. One reason is that a vast amount of public expenditure is tied
to measured changes in the cost-of-living. For example, many public pensions are indexed
to measures of the overall or “social” cost-of-living. While economists have a well developed
theory of the cost-of-living for a person, they do not have similarly well developed theory for
the cost-of-living for a society. If preferences and budgets are identical across people, then the
cost-of-living index is identical across people, and there is no problem in identifying the social
cost-of-living index. However, if preferences or budgets are heterogeneous across people (as
they clearly are), then diﬀerent people experience diﬀerent changes in the cost-of-living. In
this paper we present a new class of social cost-of-living indices. These indices aggregate
the cost-of-living indices of heterogeneous individuals. In addition, we oﬀer a nonparametric
framework for estimating these and other social cost-of-living indices.
Most social cost-of-living indices in use–such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI)–can
be understood as aggregator functions of approximations of household cost-of-living indices
(see, e.g., Prais 1958 or Nicholson 1975 and, especially, Diewert’s 1998 overview). The
CPI is the expenditure-weighted average of ﬁrst-order approximations of each individual’s
cost-of-living index. It is troubling for three reasons.1 First, it has not been shown to have a
welfare economic foundation for the case where agents are heterogeneous. Second, the CPI
uses an expenditure-weighted average which down-weights the experience of poor households
relative to rich households (and thus is sometimes called a “plutocratic” index). Finally, it
uses only ﬁrst-order approximations of each individual’s cost-of-living index, and thus ignores
substitution eﬀects.
Many researchers have used an alternative, called the “democratic index”, equal to the
arithmetic mean of household cost-of-living indices (recent work includes: Kokoski 2000;
1There are, of course, other problems involved in measuring changes the cost-of-living, including the
arrival of new goods, unobserved price heterogeneity and quality change. See Boskin (1998) and Diewert
(1998) for surveys.
1Crawford and Smith 2002; Ley 2000, 2005). This addresses our second concern, but not
the other two. Indeed, the diﬃculty of aggregating heterogeneous individual cost-of-living
indices into a sensible social cost-of-living index has led some observers to suggest abandoning
the goal of a social cost-of-living index, and focussing instead on axiomatic approaches to
measuring price change (Deaton 1998).
We are more optimistic. Our social cost-of-living index has an explicit social welfare
foundation and allows us to choose the weights on rich and poor households. It nests as
special cases commonly used indices such as the CPI. We also provide a nonparametric
method for estimating second-order approximations (which account for substitution eﬀects).
For an individual, the change in the cost-of-living is the scaling of expenditure required
to hold utility constant over a price change. Again, for any given price change, there is
heterogeneity across individuals in their cost-of-living changes because preferences and bud-
gets diﬀer across people. Our new social cost-of-living index is the answer to the following
question. What single scaling to everyone’s expenditure would hold social welfare constant
across a price change? We call this the “common-scaling” social cost-of-living index.
With this approach, the inequality-aversion of the social welfare function determines
the weights placed on the cost-of-living changes of rich and poor individuals. A ﬁrst-order
approximation is easily derived and nests commonly used indices. In particular, the CPI
results from our approach if the (indirect) social welfare function is linear and therefore
neutral to inequality. Alternatively, an index similar to the democratic index results if the
welfare function is linear in the log of expenditure and thus inequality-averse. Further,
we that this index is the unique common-scaling cost-of-living index for the case where the
weights are independent of household expenditure (as they are in the democratic index).
Our method for estimating second-order approximations relies on nonparametric esti-
mates of average derivatives. It is similar in spirit to that proposed by Deaton and Ng
(1998) for evaluating tax reforms. However, while they estimate a column of uncompensated
price eﬀects, we estimate the entire matrix of average compensated prices semi-elasticities
2(Slutsky terms). Lewbel (2001) showed that, in the presence of preference heterogenity,
the sample average of the matrix of compensated price semi-elasticities is not a consistent
estimator of the matrix of average compensated price semi-elasticities. We propose a new
estimator of this matrix which exploits the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and circumvents
Lewbel’s problem.
To illustrate, we consider changes in the cost-of-living in the U.S. between 1988 and
2000. We ﬁnd that both the weighting of rich and poor and the incorporation of second
order eﬀects have some impact on our assessment of changes in the cost-of-living.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst outline the theory of the
cost-of-living for individuals and propose a social cost-of-living index that aggregates the
heterogeneous cost-of-living indices of individuals. Next, we show that commonly used in-
dices, such as the plutocratic and democratic indices, are cases of our general approach. We
then show how to nonparametrically estimate second-order approximations of our family of
social cost-of-living indices, which includes the plutocratic and democratic cases. Finally, we
estimate various social cost-of-living indices with U.S. price and expenditure data.
2T h e o r y
2.1 Individual Cost-of-Living Index
The standard theory of the cost-of-living for a person is as follows. Let i =1 ,...,N index
individuals, each of whom lives in a household with one or more members. For each individ-
ual, the number ni gives the number of members in that person’s household. Each individual
has an expenditure level xi equal to total expenditure of that individual’s household.
Let u = V (p,x,z) be the indirect utility function which gives the utility level for an
individual living in a household with a T-vector of demographic or other characteristics z,
expenditure x and facing prices p.L e t x = C(p,u,z) be the cost function, which is the
inverse of V over x.L e t w be the expenditure-share vector, with a subscript for household
3or individual.
Many calculations are done at the household level, rather than the individual. For
household-level calculations, let h =1 ,...,H index households, let xh be the total expendi-
ture, nh be the number of members, and zh be the characteristics of household h.A s s u m e
that all members of a given household attain the same utility level, and consequently have
the same cost-of-living index. We consider environments where expenditure levels and char-
acteristics vary across households, but not within households, and where price vectors are
common across all individuals/households.
We deﬁne the individual’s cost-of-living index (COLI), πi,a st h es c a l i n gt oe x p e n d i t u r e
xi which equates utility at two diﬀerent price vectors, p0 and p1. Formally, we solve
V (p0,x i,zi)=V (p1,πixi,zi) (1)
for πi.D e n o t i n g xi = C(p0,u i,zi) and ui = V (p0,x i,zi), the solution may be written in
terms of cost functions as
πi = C(p1,u i,zi)/C(p0,u i,zi)=C(p1,u i,zi)/xi.
For a household-level calculation, we note that πi = πh for all i in household h. Although
most previous work is motivated with household-level calculations, the welfarist framework
that we employ below necessitates an individual-level analysis. When all household members
are identical, and thus have the same COLI, moving between these levels of analysis is
straightforward, and essentially amounts to reweighting.
2.2 Previous Approaches to the Social Cost-of-Living
Since the COLI is diﬀerent for individuals with diﬀerent x and z, a social cost-of-living index
(SCOLI) must somehow aggregate these individual COLIs. The most commonly used SCOLI




















The index assigns the household expenditure weight to each household-speciﬁcC O L I ,o r ,
equivalently, assigns the household per-capita expenditure weight to each person-speciﬁc
COLI. The plutocratic index is used by many statistical agencies, primarily because a ﬁrst-
order approximation to this index is computable without estimation of a demand system and
using only aggregate data. In particular, this approximation of ΠP is given by the weighted
average of price changes, where the weights are aggregate expenditure shares, which is the
methodology used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to compute the CPI.
An alternative SCOLI is the democratic index, ΠD, which uses unitary weights on house-


















Here, individual COLIs are weighted by the reciprocal of the number of household members.
The avoidance of expenditure weights is the great advantage of the democratic index (see,
e.g., Ley 2005).
Both the plutocratic and democratic indices lack a solid welfare economic foundation.
Pollak (1981) oﬀers a SCOLI which is explicitly grounded in a welfare economic problem.
Deﬁne the direct welfare function ω = W (u1,...,u N) to give the level of social welfare ω
corresponding to a vector of utilities u1,...,uN.D e ﬁne the indirect welfare function, Ω,t ob e
Ω(p,x 1,...,xN,z1,...,zN)=W (V (p,x 1,z1),...,V (p,x N,zN)), which is a function of prices,
expenditures and demographics. Deﬁn et h ei n d i r e c ts o c i a lc o s tf u n c t i o nM(p,ω,z1,...,zN)
as the minimum total (across households) expenditure required to attain the level of social
welfare ω for a population with characteristics z1,...,zN facing prices p.





where ω equals initial welfare, new welfare, or some other welfare level. Here, the numerator
is equal to the minimum total expenditure across all households required to get a welfare
level of ω when facing prices p1, and the denominator is the minimum total expenditure
when facing prices p0.
Pollak’s is a very elegant solution to the aggregation problem. However, even with
the welfare function in hand, this procedure re q u i r e sa no p t i m i z a t i o ns t e pi nw h i c ht h e
investigator determines the optimal distribution of expenditure in each price regime. This
can be hard, and Pollak’s proposal has not been widely adopted.2
2.3 The Common-Scaling SCOLI and First-Order Approximation
We propose a social cost-of-living index, Π∗, which is similar in spirit to the individual COLI
deﬁned by (1). The individual COLI equates the utility of scaled expenditure when facing
p1 to the utility of expenditure when facing p0.W ed e ﬁne the common-scaling social cost-
of-living index (CS-SCOLI), Π∗, as the single scaling of all expenditures that equates welfare
at the two diﬀerent price vectors. We solve
W (V (p0,x 1,z1),...,V (p0,x N,zN)) = W (V (p1,Π
∗x1,z1),...,V (p1,Π
∗xN,zN)) (4)
for Π∗. Just as a person’s cost-of-living index is the scaling to her expenditure that holds her
utility constant over a price change, the CS-SCOLI is the scaling to everyone’s expenditure
that holds social welfare constant over a price change.
2We note that Slesnick (2001) implements Pollak’s SCOLI. However, apart from Slesnick, we know of no
other investigators using Pollak’s SCOLI.
If preferences are identical across individuals (even those with diﬀerent demographic characteristics), then
the optimisation problem is much easier. In this case, the optimal distribution of expenditure is one
characterised by equality.
6A ﬁrst-order approximation of Π∗ may be obtained by approximating W around p0 and


















where W(·) denotes W (V (p,x 1,z1),...,V (p,x N,zN)). Rearranging terms and substituting























which expresses the approximation in terms of weighted averages of the budget share vectors,






























is a ﬁrst-order approximation to an individuals’ cost-of-living index. Thus (5) can be inter-
preted as the welfare-weighted average of ﬁrst-order approximations to individual cost-of-
living indices.
7If W is weakly concave in ui and V is weakly concave in xi,t h e nφi must be weakly
concave in xi. Ap o l a rc a s et h u so b t a i n si fW is linear in V and V is linear in xi, resulting
in no social aversion to expenditure inequality. In this case, φi is equal to the individ-
ual’s share of expenditure, xi/
PN
i=1 xi. B e l o w ,w es h o wt h a tt h i si se q u i v a l e n ti nt h eﬁrst
order to the Plutocratic index. However, this obtains if and only if social welfare is not
averse to inequality of utility and marginal utility is constant, neither of which are appealing
conditions.




∂xi is equal to 1/xi,s o
that φi =1for all i. This case yields an index which (as discussed further below) is
equivalent in the ﬁrst order to the democratic index, except that the identity weights apply
to individuals rather than households. Other welfare weights yield other SCOLIs.
Equation (5) gives a ﬁrst-order approximation to a common-scaling SCOLI for any choice
of social welfare function and indirect utility functions. It nests as special cases both
the ﬁrst-order approximation to the plutocratic index and an index similar in spirit to the
democratic index. Given the welfare weights, the common-scaling SCOLI is easily calculated
from standard data sources: it is the weighted average of proportional price changes, where
the weights are themselves weighted averages of individual household expenditure shares.
2.4 Second-Order Approximation
Equation (4) deﬁnes the CS-SCOLI (Π∗) implicitly. A ﬁrst-order approximation to (4) is of
course linear in Π∗, and thus easily solved. Higher order approximations, however, will be
nonlinear in Π∗. It is easier therefore, to place a restriction on the social welfare function
which allows us to derive an explicit expression for Π∗. This can then be approximated at
higher orders.
We proceed by suppressing the p1 argument of welfare, which can be done without loss
of generality, and by suppressing the z1,...,zN arguments of welfare, which may be done
with an equivalent-expenditure function (deﬁned below). Then, it turns out that all we
8need for an explicit solution for Π∗ is that the indirect welfare function Ω is homothetic in
it’s (equivalent) expenditure arguments. As we discuss below, homotheticity of the indirect
welfare function does not imply homotheticity of the indirect utility function.




for Π∗.B e c a u s e Ω is welfarist, it is invariant to changes which leave the utility vector
unchanged. Thus, we may substitute in (1) on the left-hand side and rewrite the implicit




which is evaluated entirely at p1.
In (8), πi depends on p1,p0,x i and zi,a n dΠ∗ depends on p1,p0 and xi and zi, i =1 ,...,N.
The dependence of πi and Π∗ on their arguments is suppressed. Here, Ω does not vary with
p1 because any changes to p1 are exactly oﬀset by changes in πi that hold the utility vector
constant, as follows from the deﬁnition of πi. We can therefore suppress p1 on both sides of




where Ω suppresses direct dependence on p1.
Indirect welfare functions are not necessarily symmetric over expenditure because house-
holds vary in their characteristics. However, symmetry of direct welfare over utility implies
symmetry of indirect welfare over equivalent-expenditure, the expenditure level which equates
utility across household types. Given a reference household type z, the equivalent-expenditure
9of person i, xe




Consequently, two people with the same level of equivalent-expenditure have the same level
of utility. If equivalent-expenditure is proportional to expenditure, we say that “equivalence-







where ∆ is the “equivalence scale” giving the ratio of expenditure needs across diﬀerent
types of households and people (see Blackorby and Donaldson 1993).
Assume now that equivalence-scale exactness holds and that the indirect welfare function
Ω is symmetric and homothetic over equivalent-expenditure. This pair of assumptions
ensures that Ω is homothetic over the expenditure vector because ESE implies that scaling
the expenditure distribution by some factor scales the equivalent-expenditure distribution
by the same factor. Homotheticity of Ω over expenditure makes social indiﬀerence curves
independent of the units of measure of expenditure, and implies that Ω is ordinally equivalent
to a function Ω0 which is homogeneous of degree 1 in x:
Ω(p,x 1,...,xN,z1,...,zN)=f (Ω0(p,x 1,...,xN,z1,...,zN))
where f is monotone and
λΩ0(p,x 1,...,x N,z1,...,zN)=Ω0(p,λx 1,...,λxN,z1,...,zN)
for any λ. The function Ω0 is not a unique homogeneous representation of Ω,b u ta l l
homogeneous representations of Ω are proportional to each other.
10Now turning to the CS-SCOLI, the assumption of homotheticity of indirect welfare yields


























Here, the CS-SCOLI is the ratio of indirect welfare given ‘inﬂated expenditure’ to indirect
welfare given expenditure. If p1 is ‘higher’ (‘lower’) than p0, then the πi are bigger (smaller)
than 1, and the numerator is bigger (smaller) than the denominator, implying that Π∗ is
bigger (smaller) than one.
Homotheticity of Ω is a real restriction that some combinations of direct social welfare
functions and indirect utility functions will not satisfy. Nevertheless, it admits interesting
cases. For example, it is satisﬁed if the direct social welfare function is utilitarian and the
indirect utility is PIGL (which includes as cases both quasi-homothetic and Almost Ideal
demands.) Moreover, in applied work on inequality, it is almost always assumed that Ω
is homothetic. For example, all relative inequality indices (such as the Gini coeﬃcient,
S-Gini indices, Atkinson indices and Generalised Entropy indices) correspond to homothetic
indirect social welfare functions.
112.5 Special Cases
To implement the CS-SCOLI, a particularly simple indirect welfare function is the Atkinson
























Given this indirect welfare function, which depends on the parameter r governing inequality-





















where the subscript denotes the value of the inequality aversion parameter.













If we rewrite this inequality-neutral CS-SCOLI in terms of household COLIs, the connection























h = xh, this becomes the plutocratic SCOLI given by (2). The restriction that
nhxe
h = xh is equivalent to the restriction that the equivalence scale ∆ is equal to nh so that
equivalent-expenditure equals per-capita household expenditure. Thus, ΠP = Π∗
r if r =1
and xe
h = xh/nh.









the geometric mean of individual COLIs. This CS-SCOLI is dual to an inequality-averse
indirect welfare function, and it down-weights extreme values of individual COLIs. If
we rewrite this inequality-averse CS-SCOLI in logs and in terms of household COLIs, the















and if nh =1for all h, then the log of this CS-SCOLI is the unweighted average of individual
log COLIs. Thus the ΠD and Π∗
r with r =0diﬀer only in that: the democratic SCOLI is an
arithmetic mean and the CS-SCOLI is a geometric mean; and the democratic SCOLI uses
unitary weights for households and the CS-SCOLI uses unitary weights for individuals.
The democratic SCOLI and the CS-SCOLI with r =0share the feature that they are
functions of household COLIs that do not depend on household expenditure levels. One
might argue that this is key the feature of the democratic SCOLI that makes it a desirable
alternative to the plutocratic SCOLI. Thus, it is reasonable to ask if there are indirect
welfare functions lying outside the Π∗
r class whose implied CS-SCOLIs do not depend on
household expenditure levels and are diﬀerent from Π∗
0, the CS-SCOLI with r =0 .T h e
proposition below establishes that there are no such alternative indirect welfare functions.
That is, Π∗
0 is the only CS-SCOLI which does not depend on household expenditure levels.
Proposition 1 The CS-SCOLI deﬁned by (10) is independent of equivalent-expenditure if
and only if it is the geometric mean of individual cost-of-living indices.
Proof. See Appendix B.
133 Estimation
Consumer demand data are typically household-level data describing expenditure on com-
modities linked to aggregate data on the prices of those commodities. Because consumer
demand micro-data are expensive to collect and process, price data are typically available
before consumption data. It is very common to use household expenditure data from past
years to evaluate the cost-of-living given current prices. In this section, we show how to use
household expenditure data collected in the past and current commodity price data to con-
struct second-order approximations of all the SCOLIs discussed in the previous subsection
(for an example of approximation of social welfare change, see Banks, Blundell and Lewbel
1996).
Since the Plutocratic and Democratic SCOLIs are similar to cases of the CS-SCOLI,
we begin by approximating the Π∗
r for an arbitrary value of r. U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tπh =
C(p,u h,z h)/xh,w em a yw r i t eΠ∗
r in terms of household-level variables and as a function of







































h = xh/δh and δh = ∆(p0,z h) (so that ESE is a maintained assumption).
We construct second-order Taylor approximations of this expression at a new price vector
p1 by expanding around p0. The only way prices enter Π∗
r is through the cost function C.
The ﬁrst-order part of the approximation uses Sheppard’s lemma, which equates the ﬁrst
derivative of cost with demands, and the second-order part uses the Slutsky theorem, which
links Marshallian price and expenditure derivatives with Hicksian price derivatives. In the
following lemma, we show a second-order approximation of Π∗
r (p1).
14Lemma 2 The second-order Taylor approximation of Π∗
r (p1) about p0 may be expressed as
Π
∗
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Γh ≡∇ lnpw(p0,x h,zh)+∇lnxw(p0,x h,zh)w(p0,x h,zh)
0. (17)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The lemma shows a second-order approximation for Π∗
r (p1) which depends on weighted
averages, wr, of expenditure-share vectors, wh, and weighted averages, Γ
r
, of compensated
semi-elasticity matrices, Γh. We consider in turn: (1) ﬁrst-order approximations; (2) second-
order approximations in the absence of unobserved preference heterogeneity; and (3) second-
order approximations in the presence of unobserved preference heterogeneity.
The ﬁrst-order approximation is given by
Π
∗
r (p1) ≈ 1+dp
0w
r, (18)










share vectors, wh, are observed for all households, so the weighted average, wr,m a ya l w a y s
be calculated directly from the data (without an estimation step). Further, wr may be
estimated consistently regardless of presence of unobserved preference heterogeneity.
In the absence of unobserved preference heterogeneity, the weighted average of compen-
sated semi-elasticity matrices, Γ
r
, is estimable via (weighted) average derivative estimation.
Thus, in the absence of unobserved preference heterogeneity, all of the terms in the second-
order approximation of Π∗
r (p1) given in Lemma 2 may be estimated consistently.
With unobserved preference heterogeneity, things are more complicated. In the presence
of unobserved preference heterogeneity which is independent of observables (p,x,z),t h e
population-level weighted average of wh may still be estimated consistently via the sample
weighted average of wh.T h u s , wr, f Wr, wrwr0,a n dww0r may all be estimated consistently.
However, even with this limited form of preference heterogeneity, Lewbel (2001) shows that
the sample weighted-average of Γh is not a consistent estimator of Γ
r
. This is because,
although the unobserved preference heterogeneity is assumed independent of observables
(p,x,z), if, at a particular (p,x,z), both the derivatives and levels depend on unobserved
preference parameters (heterogeneity), then the product ∇lnxw(p0,x h,zh)w(p0,x h,zh)0 may
have a nonzero expectation.
We propose a new estimator of Γ
r
which exploits the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix
and circumvents Lewbel’s problem.

























0 + ∇lnx (w(p0,x h,zh)w(p0,x h,zh)
0)).
16(20)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition here is that although the sample weighted-average of Γh does not yield a
consistent estimate of Γ
r
, the sample weighted-average of Γh + Γ0







, which given symmetry is equal to 2Γ
r
.T h em a t r i xΓh contains a derivative
(∇lnxw(·)) multiplied by a level (w(·)0), which may be polluted by covariance between the
derivative and the level. In contrast, the analogous part of Γs
h = 1
2 (Γh + Γ0
h) contains a
derivative of a product (∇lnx (w(·)w(·)0)). The covariance within this product does not
pollute the estimate of the average derivative of the product. This is because, if unobserved
preference heterogeneity parameters (error terms) are independent of (p,x,z),t h e ng i v e n
(p,x,z), the derivative of the average is the average of the derivative. Thus, we can consis-
tently estimate the expectation of Γs
h locally at a particular (p,x,z), and aggregate across
(p,x,z) to obtain a consistent estimate of the population-level weighted average derivative,
Γ
r
. In an environment with independent unobserved preference heterogeneity, we may esti-
mate Γ
r
under Slutsky symmetry with any standard average derivative estimator, suitably
modiﬁed to include the weights nh (xe
h)
r, and use the estimate to compute the second-order
approximation given by Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
3.1 Cases of Interest

















where sample averages and average derivatives are weighted by equivalent expenditure. Here,
the cross-product of weighted-average budget shares drops out of the approximation. If
xe
h = xn/nh, so that equivalent-expenditure is equal to per-capita household expenditure,
17the plutocratic SCOLI results.


































, ww0D and f WD are unweighted (across households) averages. The only
diﬀerence between (21) and (22) is in the weighting of the averages.





















Here, the averages are weighted by the number of members in each household, and the
weighted-average of cross-products of budget shares is replaced by a cross-product of weighted
average budget shares.
4 Illustration
The approximate SCOLIs described above all employ weighted averages of expenditure shares
and weighted average derivatives of expenditures shares. Weighted sample means and
weighted average derivatives both converge at
√
H where H is the number of households
(observations) if weights are strictly positive and bounded. Given that ESE implies xe
h is
positive if xh is positive and that both xh and nh are positive by deﬁnition, if we add the
18restriction that both xh and nh are bounded, the condition on weights is satisﬁed.
The estimation of weighted average derivatives may be implemented by various empirical
strategies. For example, Deaton and Ng (1998) use Hardle and Stoker’s (1989) estimator
which does not use estimates of derivatives of demands for any particular observations, but
rather recovers the average derivative by multiplying the derivative of the density function
with the level of demand. We use a more direct approach: we use a high dimensional
nonparametric kernel estimator to generate an estimate of the matrix of derivatives Γs
h,
deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 0 ) ,f o ra l lh =1 ,...,H. Then, we compute Γ
r
,d e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n
(19), as the weighted average of Γs
h. Although our estimation strategy diﬀers from Deaton
and Ng, the average derivative is characterized by fast convergence because we average over
the H slowly-converging kernel estimates of Γs
h. Thus, both weighted averages and weighted
average derivatives converge at
√
H,w h e r eH is the number of households that face p0.
We use household-level microdata on expenditures from the American Consumer Ex-
penditure Surveys (CES), 1980 to 1998, and aggregate commodity price data from 1980 to
2000, both of which are publicly available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These
are the data which underlie the Consumer Price Index produced by the BLS. The CPI is
the weighted average of commodity price changes, where the weights are equal to aggregate
commodity expenditure shares, which may be interpreted as household expenditure-weighted
household expenditure shares. Thus, the CPI is a ﬁrst-order approximation to the Pluto-
cratic index, ΠP, as described above.
We estimate our model using household expenditures in 19 distinct price regimes repre-
senting annual commodity prices for 9 goods for each year 1980 to 1998. The CES microdata
are available at the monthly and quarterly level, but since our commodity price data are
annual over calendar years, we use only households for which a full year of expenditure is
available, with the full year starting in December, January or February. Since the rental
ﬂows from owned accommodation are diﬃcult to impute and commodity prices are available
only for urban residents, we use only rental-tenure urban residents of the continental USA.
19There remain 4705 households in our restricted sample, with approximately 300 observations
in each year from 1980 to 1998. Following Harris and Sabelhaus (2000), we reweight all
household data to reﬂect these sample restrictions. These weights are used in the con-
structing sample weighted averages and weighted average derivatives, but not in the kernel
estimation step. Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Appendix A.
The nine commodities are: food at home; food out; rent; household furnishing and op-
eration; clothing; motor fuel; public transportation; alcohol; and tobacco products. These
commodities account for approximately 3/4 of household consumption for households in the
sample. We account for two household demographic characteristics: the number of household
members; and the age of the head of the household. To compute equivalent-expenditure,
we use an equivalence scale equal to the square root of the number of household members,
which is the “standard” equivalence scale in the measurement of inequality. Results are
essentially identical if we instead use equivalence scales based on the ratios of oﬃcial US
poverty lines for diﬀerent household sizes.
T a b l e1g i v e se s t i m a t e dﬁrst-order approximations of various SCOLIs. We do not provide
standard errors in the table because the variance in the estimates due to the variance of the
estimates of Γ
r
, ww0r and wr is very small (bootstrapped standard errors are less than 0.05
percentage points for all estimates shown).3 We present illustrative results for 2 periods:
1988 to 1998 and 1999 to 2000. The former period is chosen because the BLS used 1982-4
expenditure weights for calculating the CPI over that entire period. (Since the late 1990s,
the BLS has updated the weights used in the CPI about every 2 years.) In our example, we
use 1983 expenditure weights for that period. The latter period is chosen because although
most prices were fairly stable over 1999 to 2000, the price of motor fuel rose by 30% over this
year. Since motor fuel represents a comparatively large expenditure share for the bottom
half of households, we may expect the distributional weights to matter over such a price
change. We use 1998 expenditure weights to assess this price change.
3As noted by Ley (2000, 2005), the variance induced by by the variance of Γ
r
, ww0r
and wr is likely
dwarfed by the variance induced by measurement error in proportional price changes, dp.
20On the left-hand side of Table 1 we present the plutocratic and democratic indices, and
on the right-hand side, we present 3 CS-SCOLIs. Recall that the Π∗
1 and Π∗
0 indices are
similar to the plutocratic and democratic indices, respectively, but are motivated from an
explicit welfare foundation. The Π∗
−1 index is not analogous to any commonly used SCOLI,
but may also be motivated from a welfare foundation. The ﬁrst-order approximations
aggregate proportional price changes with weighted averages of expenditure shares. For
the Π∗
0 index, the weights are uniform across individuals. For the Π∗
1 index, the weights
are directly proportional to equivalent-expenditure and for the Π∗
−1 index, the weights are
inversely proportional to equivalent-expenditure.
Table 1: Estimated SCOLIs, percentage changes
expenditure ﬁrst-order





1988-1998 1983 32.5 33.5 32.5 33.5 34.4
1999-2000 1998 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.7
Over the long period 1988 to 1998, the plutocratic index rose by 32.5%.4 However,
because price changes favoured rich households over poor households during this period, the
democratic index which up-weights the experience of poor households, rose by 33.5%. The
estimated ﬁrst-order approximations of the CS-SCOLIs which are similar to these indices
are identical to the ﬁrst decimal place (but diﬀer beyond that). The CS-SCOLI which
puts yet more weight on the experience of poor households, Π∗
−1, is larger still, with an
estimated increase in the social cost-of-living of 34.4%. Thus, over this 10-year period, we
see that diﬀerent plausible weighting structures in the common-scaling SCOLI yield diﬀerent
pictures of the path of inﬂation. In particular, the index which emphasizes the experience
of poor households shows 2 percentage points more inﬂa t i o nt h a nt h a tw h i c he m p h a s i z e s
4Over 1988 to 1998 and 1999 to 2000, the CPI rose by 35.6% and 3.3%, respectively. We do not expect
the CPI and our Plutocratic index to be numerically identical because the CPI is computed from a much
larger and ﬁner set of commodities.
21the experience of rich households. These results are consistent with other studies showing
variation in the cost-of-living across income classes (see, e.g., Pendakur 2002, Ley 2002,
Chiru 2005a,b).
In considering the one-year price change for 1999 to 2000, we use expenditure weights
from 1998 because the BLS has recently announced that they will update expenditure weights
every 2 years with a 2 year lag. Here, we see that the large increase in the relative price of
motor fuel had a noticeable distributional eﬀect. The plutocratic and democratic SCOLIs
are 4.5% and 4.6%, respectively, due to the fact that motor fuel is a necessity whose price
increases aﬀects poor households more than rich households. The welfare-derived CS-
SCOLIs illustrate the same story, with the Π∗
1 showing a 4.5% increase in the social cost-of-
living and the Π∗
−1 index showing a 4.7% increase in the social cost-of-living.
Table 2 presents estimates of ﬁrst- and second-order approximations of the CS-SCOLIs
for the same years. Here, we may illustrate the importance of accounting for substitution
eﬀects in the assessment of the social cost-of-living. Since the second-order term in the
approximation is an average of a quadratic form in the Slutsky matrix of each household, ac-
counting for substitution eﬀects must (weakly) reduce the estimated SCOLI if all households
are rational. For all the comparisons below, this is the case.









1988-1998 1983 32.5 33.5 34.4 32.0 32.6 33.3
1999-2000 1998 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.6
For the period 1988 to 1998, accounting for substitution eﬀects reduces our estimate of
the increase in inequality-neutral CS-SCOLI, Π∗
1, index from 32.5% to 32.0%, a diﬀerence of
0.5 percentage points. Turning to the two inequality-averse CS-SCOLIs, Π∗
0 and Π∗
−1,t h e
reduction is 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively. This magnitude for substitution
eﬀects is plausible given the high level of commodity aggregation in our illustration, though
22somewhat smaller than the magnitudes identiﬁed in the Boskin Report (1996).
It is natural to expect that substitution eﬀects will matter more if expenditure weights are
updated infrequently or with long lags. This is because if expenditure weights are updated
continuously and instantly, a ﬁne sequence of ﬁrst-order approximations will capture the
behavioral responses that the substitution eﬀects ‘predict’ (see Vartia 1983). Since the BLS
has substantially reduced delays and increased the frequency of expenditure updates, it may
be important to assess the size of second-order eﬀects over short periods. Turning to the
one-year price change from 1999 to 2000 which uses 1998 expenditure weights, we still see
substitution eﬀects of noticeable magnitude. During this period, the price of motor fuel rose
by 30%, which is large enough in principle to induce changes in behavior to reduce the cost
o ft h ep r i c ec h a n g e . T h eb o t t o mr o wo fT a b l e2s u g g e s t st h a tt h i sw a st h ec a s e . W es e et h a t
the estimated ﬁrst-order approximations of the Π∗
0 and Π∗
−1 CS-SCOLIs are 0.1 percentage
points higher than the estimated second-order approximations. Although this eﬀect is small,
such eﬀects may ’add up’ over long periods of time because substitution eﬀects always have
t h es a m e( n e g a t i v e )s i g n .
5C o n c l u s i o n
For an individual, the change in the cost-of-living is the scaling of expenditure required to
hold utility constant over a price change. Because preferences and resources diﬀer across
people, for any price change, there is heterogeneity across individuals in their cost-of-living
changes. Thus, a social cost-of-living approach to the measurement of price change faces a
formidable aggegation problem. Whose cost-of-living should we be measuring?
The common-scaling social cost-of-living index (CS-SCOLI) developed in this paper an-
swers the following question. What single scaling to everyone’s expenditure would hold social
welfare constant across a price change? This index has social welfare foundations, and allows
the investigator to easily choose the weight placed on rich and poor households. It is easy to
23implement, and we have provided methods for estimating both ﬁrst- and second-order ap-
proximations to the index. The latter capture substitution eﬀects. Our estimation methods
allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity.
Finally, the CS-SCOLI has as special cases objects that are either identical or very similar
to all the commonly used social cost-of-living indices, and in particular, the plutocratic and
democratic SCOLIs. This is important. In our framework there is a social welfare function
and equivalence scale which lead to the CPI. Thus the CPI is given an explicit social welfare
foundation. Moreover, an investigator that ﬁnds the social welfare function and equivalence
scale corresponding to the CPI unpalatable can easily generate a SCOLI more to her tastes.
6 Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Table A1 gives summary statistics for the data we use in our analysis.
Table A1: The Data Min Max Mean Std Dev
expenditure shares food-in 0 0.85 0.26 0.13
food-out 0 0.63 0.08 0.07
rent 0 0.94 0.41 0.15
hh furn/equip 0 0.45 0.04 0.05
clothing 0 0.41 0.06 0.05
motor fuel 0 0.43 0.07 0.06
public trans 0 0.39 0.09 0.04
alcohol 0 0.54 0.03 0.04
tobacco 0 0.26 0.03 0.04
log-expenditure 6.66 10.76 9.05 0.55
log household size 0 2.56 0.65 0.59
age of head (less 40) -24 24 2.9 11
247 Appendix B: Proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The CS-SCOLI given by (10) may be written as a function of equivalent-expenditures,
xe













If Π∗ is independent of xe


























which is a functional equation explored by Eichhorn (1978, equation 3.6.2). He shows that













where c and ki are constants. Since e Ω is symmetric, ki = k,a n ds i n c eΠ
∗
(1,...,1) = 1,












25which is the CS-SCOLI given by equation (13) with r =0 .
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The approximation is given by
Π
∗







r (p0)(p1 − p0)
which may be rewritten in terms of proportional changes dp as
Π
∗







r (p0) e P0dp (25)
where e P0 is a diagonal matrix with p0 on the main diagonal. Application of the chain
rule and Sheppard’s lemma (∇pC(p0,u,z)=q(p0,u,z), the quantity vector), together with
substitution of the duality condition C(p0,u h,z h)=xh,a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of expenditure
shares, w(p,u,z) ≡ e P
q(p,u,z)
x , implies that the ﬁrst term may be expressed in terms of a




































































































Although much messier, the derivation of the second-order terms proceeds by the same
process. Continued diﬀerentiation with use of the chain rule and re-application of Shep-













+ rww0r +( 1− r)w
rw




















Γh ≡ Γ(p0,x h,zh) ≡∇ lnplnp0 lnC((p0,x h,zh)=∇lnpw(p0,x h,zh)+∇lnxw(p0,x h,zh)w(p0,x h,zh)
0.
The matrix-value function Γ(p,x,z) ≡∇ lnplnp0 lnC((p,x,z) is the matrix of compensated
semi-elasticities of the expenditure share equations w,a n dΓh ≡ Γ(p0,x h,zh) gives the value
of this function for each household facing p0.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3



















h, the symmetry-restricted estimated matrix of compensated semi-elasticities for a
household h,m a yb ew r i t t e na si n( 2 0 )
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